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THE STUDY OF ELEMENTARY LAW, THE PROPER
BEGINNING OF A LEGAL EDUCATION.*
The thought of our day moves mainly along two lines: the evo-
lution in all things wrought by time, and the correlation of forces,
whether of matter or of mind. To those -interested in legal educa-
tion, it has brought a new sense of the unity and permanence of what
is essential in law, and of the passing and shifting character of all
that is not essential in it. It has made law a larger thing. It has
set in a larger place. It has correlated it to the whole family of
social sciences, of which it is both child and king.
Legal science is the science dealing with the relations of man,
as a member of organized political society, to that society and,
through that society to mankind. But what is an organized political
society? Out of what conditions does it arise? What differen-
tiates it from human society at large?
These questions reach far. They belong to the domain of juris-
prudence, and must be studied wherever and whenever that is taught.
But jurisprudence and law, as these terms are commonly used,
are not convertible. Jurisprudence deals more with generals; law,
more with particulars. Law schools have for their main office the
imparting of such a knowledge of the legal principles and rules
*The greater part of this paper is taken from the annual President's
address, delivered by the author before the Association of American Law
Schools, August 26, i9o3.
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prevailing in, some one particular political community as will justify
the learner in: professing his ability to expound. and apply these
in practice, against all comers, as occasion may arise.
What is it that has made the law of this particular society different
from that of any other? In what does this difference consist? How
shall principles and rules be so marshalled as best to show this?
How shall their slow evolution be made clear? How much, of acci-
dent, how much of order, has there been in their development?
What light can be thrown on this by History, by the Philosophy of
History, by Psychology, by Physical Geography?
But Law is both Science and Art-a philosophy and a trade.
How does one best learn the trade-terms and trade-methods? How
in a trade of word and argument does one best acquire that sleight of
mind which takes the place of sleight of hand in the trades of
handicraft?
Our trade-masters are the courts. How shall the apprentice be
best taught to shape himself to such modes of approaching them
as may serve most the advantage of clients-to such modes of learn-
ing the lessons they daily teach as will give him the real meaning
of their judgments, the true ratio decidendi of their opinions?
Among English speaking peoples it is undisputed that Americans
have thus far provided the best facilities for education for the bar.
They were driven to it by the force of circums tances. Their system
of government was one that rested, not on personal authority, not on
historical tradition, not on political necessities, but on unwritten
law, and it was a law higher than any which their legislatures could
make or unmake. Who was to apply this higher law? Who was
to say which, in any case of doubt, was the higher? On its proper
understanding and executiorr, its just administration, its adaptation
and re-adaptation, from time to time, to fast changing social con-
ditions, hung the safety of the State. For all this it looked to its
lawyers-made by inevitable circumstances both a creative and a
conservative governing aristocracy. They were to lead in its Con-
stitutional Conventions, in its legislatures. They were alone to
officer its courts.
With these things in view, the American law student, As soon as
the United States attained political independence, was subjected to
a careful training. It was at first found in the office of some leader
of the bar. Here was he first set to reading such works as Monte-
squieu, Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Hale's History of the Common
Law, the Institutes of Justinian, and perhaps a few books of
the Pandects, and then given Blackstone's Commentaries. Wood's
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Institutes, and the later volumes, of the English Law Reports.*
Whatever else might be omitted, in any case, Blackstone's Commen-
taries never were.
Soon came the first Law School, that at Litchfield-, Connecticut,
first opened in 1784, where instruction was given by elaborate lec-
tures on the whole field of law, supported by references to leading
cases in the reports. Later Law schools followed first the same
method, and then added to it recitations from standard text-books.
The great aim was to acquaint the student with the principles of law
in such an order of arrangement, and with such reference to their
historical development, as would best impress them permanently upon
his mind. Cases were used mainly to support or illustrate antecedent
propositions. They were regarded less as sources of law than as
channels of law.
So far as office instruction went, -it -was -in the same direction.
For nearly a hundred years this was the history-the stationary
history-of legal education in the United States. It ceased to be
stationary in the seventh decade of the last century. A forvard
movement came which was marked by three great events:
*To illustrate the methods of this period, the course of reading may be
compared taken by three young men, of whom two afterwards attained
distinction, and one died in early youth:
Ezra Stiles, Jr. Harv. 1778, at Portsmouth, N. H. under Judge Parker,
and New Haven, Conn., under Chas. Chauncey.
Burlamqui's Principes de Droit Naturel; Montesqieu, de l'Esprit des
Lois; Lord Kames" History of Law; Blackstone; Wood's Maxims; Wood's
Institutes; Co. Litt.; Bacon's Abr.; Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown; Gilbert's
Evidence, Devises, and Tenures; Law of Bills of Exchange; Molley de lure
Maritirn.; Hale's Abridgement; Lex Testamentorum; Sullivan's Lectures;
Bohun's Institutes; Boot on Suits at Law; Offic. Cler. Pac.; Burn's Justice;
Dalrymple's Institutions of the Laws of Scotland, etc.; Institutes of Justinian
and part of the Pandects; Puffendorf; Poulton's Crim. Law; Salkeld's Rep.;
i and 2 Burrow; part of Lord Raymond's, Holt's and Shower's Rep. See
Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, III, 42o.
James Kent, Yale, 178Y, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., under Judge Benson.
Grotius; Puffendorf; Smollett's, Hume's and Rapin's Histories of Eng-
land; Hale, Hist. of the Comm. Law of England; Blackstone. See Memoirs of
Chandellor Kent, ig.
John Quincy Adams, Harv. 1787, Newburyport, Mass., under Chief
Justice Parsons.
Robertson's Hist. of Charles V, vol i (to get his account of feudalism)
Vattel; Blackstone (read three times); Sullivan's Lectures; Wright's Ten-
ures;" Co. Litt. Wood's Institutes; Gilbert' 'on Evidence; Fosters and
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown;'Bacdn's Pleas and Pleading; Institutes of Jus-
tinian; Buller's Nisi Prius; Barrington's Obseirations on the Statutes. See
Proceedings of Mass. Hist. Soc., 2d Series, XVI, 315, et seq.
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i. The creation of a committee on legal education, representing
the whole American bar, and its report on that subject to the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1879, urging a more scholarly and thorough
training for the profession.'
2. The extension of the term of study required for a bachelor's
degree, in two law schools,2 to three years, and the offer, in another,
3which still adhered to the two years' term, of two years more of
advanced study for bachelors of law, leading to the degree of Doctor
of Civil Law.'
3. The publication, in 187o, by Professor Langdell of Harvard,
of the first case-book, which was prepared solely for use in law
school instruction.
I have named these events in the reverse order of time, pre-
ferring what I deem their order in relative importance.
The first brought an influence to bear on courts and legislatures,
which has proved irresisitible in advancing the requirements for
admission to the bar.
The second helped greatly to make that advance possible, not
only by leading to a general lengthening of the term of study, but
by giving a higher legal education to those who were to become
themselves law teachers, and forcing those who gave it to them, in
order to be able to face their classes, to broaden their own reading
and thought in new directions and in all directions.
The third proved to be the beginning of a new theory of legal
instruction, according to which its main end from the beginning
should be to encourage and assist the student in the study and
analysis of judicial precedents, and he should be left to pick up
and arrange the elementary principles of law, as he best can, for him-
self. This theory has been put in practice at several American law
schools, and a system of instruction introduced, which is funda-
mentally different from that which formerly prevailed there, and
from that which had ever prevailed at any seat of legal education
in the history of the world.
"Die Weltgeschickte ist da Weltgericht" was the wise saying
of a great poet. Was the world's judgment, formed and expressed
'By the American Bar Association, in 1878, Am. Bar. Ass'n Reports,
II, 209-236.
2Those of Harvard and Boston Universities in x876.
zThat of Yale University in 1876.
4The history of the beginnings of the change of system, which has
been since adopted in many other Schools, is given in the journal of the
Am. Social Science Association, XI, 123.
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during the long course of ages before 1870, wrong on this point,
so vital to the question of what a sound legal education is?
But let us limit the inquiry more narrowly. There has never been
a country in which this new mode of teaching law could have been
possible, except Great Britain and its dependencies, and the United
States and their dependencies. In no other is it so fully conceded
that judges, if they do not make law, make it certain what law is.
In no other is there such a mass of authoritative judicial opinion on
every branch of public and private law.
In one respect, the United States offer a more favorable ground
for putting Professor Langdell's theory into practice than Great
Britain. Only in the United States do judicial opinions express the
final word of the sovereign power. The courts of Great Britain
must bow to the will of Parliament. The will of the Congress of
the United States must bow lo the courts of the United States. The
will of the Legislature of each State must bow to the will of its
highest court. Here, therefore, the opinions of the courts are,
in Great Britain they are not, the ultimate sotirce, in effect, of written
authority.
On the other hand, the unity of the judicial system of Great
Britain, with its one final court of appeals for all causes arising in
the kingdom proper, and another final court of appeals for all causes
arising in her dominions beyond the sea, avoids that conflict of
authority which is the despair of American jurisprudence.
A prominent advocate of the case-book system said last year in
a public address that whatever time students might devote to the
study of elementary law was worse than wasted; that no knowledge
was gained by it on which they could rely; and that the information
acquired, if any, was necessarily superficial and misleading.* In his
view, and in the view of quite a number of American law teachers,
no book should be made the direct subject of class-room instruction
in an American law school except a case-book.
The case-book is always a collection of cases on some particular
topic. From its pages, aided by such explanations and additions as
the teacher may be able to crowd into his hour, the student, under the
new theory of legal education, must extract his knowledge of the
elementary law relating to that branch; and after wrestling in suc-
cession with twenty such books on twenty topics, must be left to
construct for himself an ordered and systematic body of the ele-
mentary law relating to all subjects, or perhaps be referred, to one
from an authoritative source, only at the close of his third year, as
*Reorts of the American Bar Association, XXV, 749.
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the last thing to look at before entering the bar, or as a proper
precaution before meeting the State examiners.
Instruction as to the proper study and analysis of cases, as to
their place in judicial history, as to their authority and the limits
of it; instruction on particular topics in detail based largely or
even wholly on case-books, but coming after a general knowledge
of the nature of the topic and the .outlines of its field have been
otherwise acquired ;--all this is useful and right. But can it be
safe, can it be scientific, to skim over in a few lectures or leave for
consideration in the closing months of a law school course that
orderly statement and classification of legal conceptions and proposi-
tions which it is the purpose of elementary treatises to make, and
without some familiarity with which no one, with the amplest library
to consult, can know where to look for authority on any point? There
are few lawyers who have had any considerable practice at the
bar who will be in doubt as to the answer. They have found that
what has helped them most has been the possession of clear gen-
eral notions as to the whole field of law and the manner in which
part of it is related to the rest. To give that, law schools must set
before each incoming class the outlines of law in general, substantive
and adjective, in orderly and scientific arrangement; and it should be
done, if possible, by the best teacher in the faculty. Let the student
start right, and he will come out right. Let him lean first on those
who are wiser than he for accepted definitions and systematization
of knowledge. Let him look for them to those who have made
it their business to set them forth with precision, rather than tothose
who are only trying to decide a law suit, and to state their reasons
as briefly as they can.
The main argument usually urged in favor of what for con-
venience may be called the case-system is that it is the inductive
method; and that only inductive methods can be tolerated by modem
science.
What is the meaning of the term "inductive method," as thus used
to describe a method of learning law? It must be the method of
proceeding from a study of particular decisions in particular law
suits to ascertain by induction from these some general rule or rules
of action, the application of which to a particular state of facts it
was the purpose of each decision to make. It is, in the language
of the logicians, a formal illation of a universal from singulars,
produced by the mere action of the mind. It has little resemblance
to-a material illation of a universal from singulars, dependent upon an
objective process of investigating particular facts. In studying
legal problems, facts are mere conditions upon which the reason is
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to work, and have no intrinsic importance. Every judicial decision
is, of course, a fact. But the fact that it was reached in a certain
case is of no philosophic importance, except as it may illustrate the
history of legal science; and that, to a beginner at least, is far more
clearly shown by leading him to compare the institutional writers of
successive centuries-Glanvil with Bracton, Blackstone with Kent.
Any commendation, therefore, of the inductive method as the
only scientific manner of investigating natural phenomena and physi-
cal problems is irrelevant to the question of applying the inductive
method in legal education. That method is all important in deriving
certainties from uncertainties, the knowable from the unknown.
But it is worthless, except as a mode of mental discipline, when
applied to deriving known principles of law from recorded opinions
of certain judges, of which these principles are, or are intended to
be, the foundation, and in which they are generally named and
stated with more or less of formal precision. When thus used, it
becomes more properly a deductive method, proceeding from analysis
to synthesis.
Bacon revolutionized the processes of philosophy with respect
to the study of the physical world. He left them where Aris-
totle left them with respect to the study of reasoning from
assumed premises to logical conclusions by pure laws of
thought.1  He left them as Aristotle left them, in their appli-
cation to methods of legal education, and we have his own
woid for it. In his de Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum,
the father of the inductive philosophy devoted a separate title'
to the Sources of Law. Unless, he says, law is certain, it cannot
be just. Hence, that law is best quae minimum relinquit arbitrio
judicis.' His ideal to aim at was the formation of an official code
of written law, stated with such clearness that he who runs might
read it.4 Meanwhile, for the better understanding of what the
written law might leave doulitful, the judgments of the highest
courts were to be looked to as the surest guide. They were to be
arranged and digested in order of time, not in that of their sub-
ject-matter, since not only the decisions, but the times in which they
were pronounced, were to be considered in estimating their due
authority. This work was to be done at public cost, and not by any
of the judges, lest they should stuff the book too full of their own
opinions. 5
'See Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. XVII.
-Lib. VIII. Cap. III.
3Works, Ed. of 1803, VII, 44.4ibid., 453, Aphorism LXVIII.&Works, VII, 457, Aphorisms LXXV, LXXVI.
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Such works, however, were for the information of the lawyer or
the citizen. So far as they set forth the rules of public law, they were
also proper to be put in the hands of the student of law. Not so
as to private law. This must be taught by institutional treatises,
set out in clear and plain order, "not omitting some subjects and
dwelling too long on others, but touching upon each briefly, so that
to a student afterwards coming to read the whole body of the
law nothing may appear wholly new, but as that of which some
little, notion had been previously imparted (levi aliqua notione prae-
ceptum).
No one who reads this chapter of Bacon's philosophy will
question his attitude towards the teaching of elementary law. To
quote his very words: "Youths and novices are to be prepared for
receiving and imbibing more deeply and conveniently the knowledge
and the difficulties of jurisprudence by institutes." 2
He would also have in each country a book setting forth its
legal rules, and after each of them, which, is to be stated in brief
and comprehensive words, adding illustrations and decisions of
cases best fitted to explain it (decisiones casuum maxime luciden-tae
ad explicationem).3
In the same vein, he has a word of caution for us who are law
teachers. Lectures, he says, on law, and the exercises of those who
are devoted to the study of law, should be so framed and ordered
as all to tend rather to quieting than exciting questions and con-
troversies as to what the law is. For now, and from a remote
antiquity, too, it has been a kind of contest between all law teachers
how to multiply doubts and questions as to law, as if for the sake
of showing how bright they were.'
Bacon took pains himself to prepare an elementary law book for
the benefit of students. His Elements of the Common Law, published
in I63o, 5 came at once into use as a text-book, and held its place
as such until the close of the next century.' In his preface to that
work, he observes that he could think of no way in which he could
essay to pay his debt to his profession so well as by collecting the
'Ibid, 458, Aphorism LXXXI.
2Praeparendi sunt juvenes et novitii ad scientiant et ardua juris altius et
conmnodius haurienda et imbibenda per institutiones. Ibid.
2Ibid, 459, Aph. LXXXIV.4Ibid, Aph. XCIII.
5 Works, IV, I-81.
8Theophilus Parsons dissuaded John Quincy Adams, when a student
in his office, from reading it, saying that it taught rules rather than
principles. Proc. Mass. Soc., 2d Series, XVI, 412.
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rules and grounds dispersed throughout the body of the laws of
England, for-to quote his words-"Hereby no small light will
be given in new cases and such wherein there is no direct authority,
to sound into the true conceit of law by the depth of reason; in
cases wherein the authorities do square' and vary, to confirm the law
and to make it received one way; and in cases where the law is
cleared by authority, yet nevertheless to see more profoundly into
the reason of such judgment and settled cases, thereby to make
more use of them for the decision of other cases more doubtful;
so that the uncertainty of law, which is the most principal and
just challenge that is made to the laws of our nation at this time,
will by this new strength laid to the foundation, somewhat the more
settle and be corrected." 2
His book sets forth certain rules, it will be recollected, each
being followed by a number of illustrations, often taken from re-
ported cases. To these cases, however, he did not refer, ' for, he
says, "I judged it a matter undue and preposterous to prove rules
and maxims, wherein I had the examples of Mr. Littleton and
Mr. Fitzherbert, whose writings are the institutions of the laws of
England; whereof the one forbeareth to vouch any authority alto-
gether; the other never reciteth a book but when he thinketh the
case so weak in credit of itself as it needeth surety.""
A great American lawyer and law teacher, speaking in the same
vein, has said that cases do not make principles: they only illustrate
them; and that the well trained student has a higher learning than
they can furnish. "He does not," to quote his words, "need to wade
through hundreds of volumes of books to see whether a particular
point has been somewhere or other decided. He knows how it was
decided, if it ever was, and how it ought to be decided if it never
was. I
The term "case-lawyer" is justly one of reproach. What does
it mean? He is a case-lawyer to whom the natural appeal to author-
ity is to a volume of reports. He is a case-lawyer to whom a reported
case is anything more than a statement of how a particular court
decided a particular cause by applying particular rules to particular
facts. If any such rule was a new one, the decision was wrong,
'i.e. in modem phrase, "square off," as one pugilist confronts another in
fighting attitude.
2Works IV, io.
zIn the original edition.
'Op. cit., [3, [4.
' Edward J. Phelps, Orations and Emays, 83.
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unless it be a rule consistent with and flowing from the reason
of the Jaw.
To what end is an opinion formally pronounced by a court of
last resort? Certainly its primary office is not to constitute a source
of supply from which law can be dug out by pains and difficulty.
It is, on the contrary, at is best when it makes what the law as to a
certain point is and how it applies to the case in hand most clear
and easy of apprehension. Lord Bacon well observed that judg-
ments "anchorae legum sunt, ut leges republicae."1  They serve,
that is, to hold the law firm in its place, just as the law serves to
hold the State firm in its place. But the State was before the law,
the law before the judgment. A case is worthless unless there is
something which underlies it.
Fortunately for the student of law, these underlying proposi-
tions or principles are neither numerous nor obscure. In the words
of the late Chancellor Hammond, in the able report to the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1892 of its committee on Legal Education:
"No conception held in common by a large number of men such
as the members of a State or great community can be very complex
in its nature or difficult of comprehension. This may be taken for
granted as one of the laws of thought. Consequently the fundamen-
tal notions out of which the rules of law are derived must be of this
simple character, since it is in. the general acceptance and uniformity
of these notions that the common law exists as such."2The case-system turns judges into oracles-or idols. It tends
to put the student back into the ranks of those of former gen-
erations who thought of law only as a rule prescribed by a supe-
rior authority. If that be all of it, it may well be sought by
going to the highest source of authority, and with us it is the
courts that have the last word for the decision of every right or
duty. But it was the right, the duty, or the absence of it, on which
the decision hung: it is these that must be known before it can be
comprehended.
In all instruction by the case-system, indeed, in actual practice,
the teacher is compelled to supplement and support his work by
reference to text-books, and statements of elementary propositions,
and more or less of the proper classification of such propositions.
The case-book may not begin, but conclude such a statement.,*
1 De Augmentis Scientiarum, Aphorism LXXIIL2Reports of the American Bar Association,. XV, 342.
*See, for an example of this, Professor Beale's Cases on the Conflict
of laws, at the end of the third volume of which comes a general exposition,
covering forty-five pages, of the elementary conceptibns and rules relating to
that subject.
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The instructor is forced to begin with one, oral and therefore neces-
sarily meagre, inadequate, and imperfectly apprehended.
Is he taking up a case-book on Torts? What are torts? Why
are these cases classified together? The instructor or the case-
book must first explain the division between Torts and Contracts,
the nature of Quasi Contracts, of a legal obligation, of any obliga-
tion.
Is he carrying his class through a case-book on Criminal Law
and Procedure? How do public wrongs differ from private ones?
How does our law define this crime or that? What is burglary? Why
send the inquirer to some ancient case for the answer, when the
definition is better stated in every elementary treatise on the subject?
It is a definition to be learned by heart. Let him learn it in its
best form.
Is it said that he will remember it better or understand it better
if he digs it out for himself from a series of cases? Is there not
more danger that the conceptions acquired from the earlier ones
may pre-occupy his mind, and obscure the closer and fuller ones
given in the later? He is dealing, we must remember, with the
grammar of law; with things that cannot be controverted; with
things that every lawyer must know and have at his instant com-
mand.
The young man who has learned by heart a legal maxim or
definition, of acknowledged authority and unexceptionable phrase,
weighing every word, as weigh he must, in order to learn it, has put
an arrow in his quiver that he will find his best weapon on a sudden
call. I know I found it so when at the bar. I know that no argu-
ment now impresses me from the bar more than one proceeding from
settled principles, with no reference to reported cases.
Who has ever opened the first book of the Institutes of Justinian,
or of the Digest, without feeling his mind impressed by that stately
sequence of definitions and foundation rules? They need no explana-
tion, or at least to the Roman, they needed none. To him they proved
themselves, and for the most part they are true for all men and all
times.
In any country governed by an official code, it will hardly be
questioned that that must be read by and, so far as it may need it,
explained to every student of law. That code will have gathered
into an orderly whole whatever is most important in such rules of
conduct as may have been established by proper usage, judicial
precedents, legislative action. Thereafter, all prior usage, precedent,
legislation, will be studied by the beginner mainly for the help
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they give in understanding the just meaning and effect of the
language of the code. The day may come when he will have the
leisure and ability to look at them as part of national or universal
history, but if it comes while he is yet preparing himself for ad-
mission to the bar, it will be in the closing stages of his preparation.
The same reasons, though with a less necessity, apply to the
student of law in a country whose law is still unwritten. It is, as
Sir Henry Maine has so well said, always and in every land written
out unofficially by private hands, before it becomes a matter of
public record. Courts are its echoes.*
The European system of legal education has always been founded
on that of the Roman Empire. Roman law was taught as a system
of deductive science. The Corpus Juris proceeds from assertions
of principles to their application to various cases. The Institutes
are a compendium of elementary law, prepared by law school pro-
fessors, avowedly as a law school text-book. They are followed by the
Iigest, in which the same principles are more fully stated and illus-
trated. Then came the statute laws of recent times.
Can, indeed, in the nature of things, a science like law be intel-
ligently taken up by one who has never been introduced to an
acquaintance with its fundamental terms and conceptions?
It is said that Professor Agassiz was accustomed to begin his
instructions in ichthyology by giving each student a fish and telling
him to describe it. It was not a bad way. The teacher of physical
science has this advantage over us. But can we learn algebra by
having a quadratic equation flung at us, at the start, and being
asked to explain it?
Some of our educational theorists undertook, a few years ago, to
carry the "inductive system" into our primary schools. The mul-
tiplication table was no longer taught. Children were to be gently
led to construct one for themselves, should they deem it useful, and
only after fully apprehending the methods and processes on which
it rested. They tell a story of a little girl-the product of this era-
who was asked by an aunt how much seven times six made. "Oh,
dear," was the reply, "I worked a week over that, last winter. I
made up my mind it was either 4o or 42 . I've forgotten which, and
I don't care now, for we have got through multiplication."
*The respect which the courts feel for "elementary treatises of acknowl-
edged authority," it may safely be said often exceeds that paid to any judicial
opinions except their own. See Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 1O2 U. S., 451,
456: The Majestic, x66 U. S., 375, 386.
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There are those who would conduct our high schools on the same
theory, and let the scholars study what they like and as they like,
without the drudgery of laying a foundation first. A Massachu-
setts Latin school teacher has recently complained of the captious
way in which college examiners mark the papers presented in
English, and condition applicants for admission for mistakes in
spelling or diction. Even if they were bad ones, he thought they
should be overlooked, if the paper showed a sound appreciation of
the subject from a literary point of view.
Germany, a few years ago, yielded somewhat to suggestions of
this kind. In 1892, her system of secondary education was revised
so as greatly to increase the use of the inductive method of instruc-
tion, and lessen the amount of grammatical and logical training
previously required. The results were disastrous. Those who
passed from the school to the university were found to be lacking, as
compared with those of previous years, in clear thought and close
reasoning. A general conference of the educational authorities was
held at Berlin in I9oo, to consider the situation, and in 19oi a
new "School Order" .was adopted, showing a decided reversion to
the old usages, by adding seven hours a week more of gymnasium
instruction in the Latin language.
If then we are to trust the experience of the world, to teach
law by cases only, or by cases mainly, without first grounding the
learner in the elements of the subject is, so far as scientific methods
of instruction are concerned, to begin at the wrong end. It is to
explain the foundation of a building by examining the roof, or rather
by scrutinizing a few of the shingles.
Is the "case-system" to be adopted as a mode of mental disci-
pline, or as strengthening the analytic faculty.
No serious study fails in some measure to discipline and reinforce
the mind. But at the time of life which the law student has reached,
and at the stage of education to which he must have attained, in
order to be fit to enter on professional studies, mental discipline
must be relegated to a secondary place.
The American high school or academy has pushed itself forward
until the best of them now hold half the field formerly occupied by
our older colleges, and the entire field now occupied by our weaker
colleges. They have come to give to every American boy his best
chance to acquire that texture of the mind which is the best gift
of general education. It is, since the modern extension-the undue
extension, I venture to think--of the elective system, in the fitting
school, more than in the college, that habits of intellectual discipline
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are impressed. There are certain studies which must be pursued
there, for the simple reason that entrance to college cannot otherwise
be gained. Whether the boy likes them or dislikes them, he must
become their master.
The best things we learn in early life are the hardest things and
the least agreeable. Every man's life has its irksome duties, and he
who has not learned in boyhood to do unwelcome tasks, and do them
well, enters on his later years under a sad handicap. James Mar-
tineau said that the college study which had done him the greatest
good was advanced mathematics, and that he took it because he
hated it.
The students in the principal American law schools have
had at least a high school education and that discipline, from
enforced tasks performed during a course of years, for
which it stands. If they have added a college course, further
discipline has been also gained. High school and college are fields
for discipline. It is, or ought to be, one of their main and pecu-
liar ends. It is not and cannot be a main end for a law school to
pursue. The law school requires, as a condition of entrance, what
presupposes the possession of a fair degree of it. Its object is to
teach law, and to invigorate the mind only as every science faith-
fully pursued strengthens the pursuer in the chase.
The report to the American Bar Association in 1892 of its com-
mittee on legal education, to which reference has been made, well
expressed what then was, and I believe still is, the conviction of the
legal profession, regarding the subject under consideration. The
modem view (to summarize its conclusions) of the nature of human
law leads directly to a natural and practical plan of elementary study.
Its subject matter is those relations of men to the State or under the
State to each other which are the necessary result of membership
in a political communiry. These relations exist before the law and
are regulated, not created, by it. They give rise to rights and duties.
It makes no difference in practical effect whether the right or
duty is so plain that all must own it, or one resting on some posi-
tive enactment. In either case, courts enforce it; in neither case do
they create it. The elements of the law, therefore must be taught,
and formally taught, to every student, with due regard to their
history, but with first regard to their essential character.
There is a juristic encyclopedia, as the Germans phrase it, that
must be mastered by whoever would be a true lawyer. It must
receive his attention at the beginning of his course, and also at the
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close: at the beginning, as one must put every subject before a
beginner, in outline; at the close, as he reviews his work, in its
totality, scientifically considered, and yet in outline, too.
It is the natural and proper aim of the law-teacher to impress
upon his classes the elements of law. If he has done that, and set
them in their due relations, he has done well. It is not superficial
work. It is the only foundation work. Principles, not cases, are
the building stones of law, here and everywhere, now and always.
Simeon E. Baldwin.
